

- ▶ JOÃO MARCOS, *Logics of Formal Inconsistency*.  
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According to the classical consistency presupposition, contradictions have an explosive character: Whenever they are present in a theory, anything goes, and no sensible reasoning can thus take place. A logic is paraconsistent if it disallows such presupposition, and allows instead for some inconsistent yet non-trivial theories to make perfect sense. The *Logics of Formal Inconsistency*, **LFIs**, form a particularly expressive class of paraconsistent logics in which the metatheoretical notion of consistency can be internalized at the object-language level. As a consequence, the **LFIs** are able to recapture consistent reasoning by the addition of appropriate consistency assumptions. So, for instance, while typical classical rules such as disjunctive syllogism (from A and  $\langle \text{not-}A \rangle\text{-or-}B$ , infer B) are bound to fail in a paraconsistent logic (because A and  $\langle \text{not-}A \rangle$  could both be true for some A, independently of B), they can be recovered by an **LFI** if the set of premises is enlarged by the presumption that we are reasoning in a consistent environment (in this case, by the addition of  $\langle \text{consistent-}A \rangle$  as an extra hypothesis of the rule). The present contribution will provide an introduction to the class of **LFIs** ([1, 2]), as well as an illustration of how rich this class is, in that it naturally contains most logics originating from both the Brazilian and the Polish schools of paraconsistency and is characterized by the same kind of derivability adjustment theorem that gives foundation to the logics originating from the Belgian school of paraconsistency.

[1] JOÃO MARCOS, *Logics of Formal Inconsistency*, Phd Thesis, IST/UTL and UNICAMP, 2005.

*URL Address*: <http://wslc.math.ist.utl.pt/ftp/pub/MarcosJ/05-M-PhDthesis.pdf>.

[2] WALTER CARNIELLI, MARCELO E. CONIGLIO AND JOÃO MARCOS, *Logics of Formal Inconsistency*, *Handbook of Philosophical Logic* (Dov M. Gabbay and Franz Guenther, editors), 2nd edition, volume 14, Springer, Dordrecht, 2007, pp. 1–93.